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The Process Patent Amendments Act:
The Labyrinth
David L. HIitchcock" & Craig Allen Nard"
TNTRODUCTION
The Process Patent Amendment Act of 19881 ("Act") has its
genesis in a desire to improve United States commercial competi-
tiveness and to place process and product patents on an equal foot-
ing.2 To accomplish this purpose, the Act creates a cause of action
for the importation into the United States or the sale or use within
the United States of products made by a patented process and ap-
plies regardless of the location where the process is practiced (i.e.
in the United States or in a foreign location).
This complex Act presents numerous questions and issues, yet
provides little guidance for one who attempts to interpret its provi-
sions. For.example, are the procedures and remedies different
when the process is practiced in the U.S. rather than in a foreign
country? Does the Act create a cause of action against purchasers
of products made by the process? Under what circumstances is
notice of infringement required? When notice is required, to whom
@ 1993 David L. Hitchcock & Craig Allen Nard. This Article presents the current
views of the authors and does not necessarily represent those of their firms or their firms'
clients.
* Officer, Richards, Medlock & Andrews, Dallas; University of Cincinnati, B.S.Ch.E.
1973; University of Toledo, J.D. 1976.
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1. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§
9001-9007, 102 Stat. 1107, 1563-1567 (1988) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 154,
271, 287 (1988)). The Process Patent Amendments Act of 1988 is a subsection of the
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act and was enacted on August 23, 1988. It became
effective on February 23, 1989.
2. Only time will tell whether the Act will achieve this limited purpose or elevate
process patents above product patents. After all, the owner of a process patent not only
enjoys a presumption of validity, but in proper circumstances, a presumption of infringe-
ment as well.
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must notice be sent, and what should the notice contain? What is
the extent and applicability of the Grandfather Clause? Does the
Act apply to methods of use as well as processes of manufacture?
Following a brief discussion of the history of the Act, this Article
discusses these questions and possible resolutions. Upon examina-
tion, it will be seen that the Act may result in use more widespread
than Congress intended.
I. THE STATE OF THE LAW
A. The Law Prior to February 23, 1989, Relating to Products
of Patented Processes and Why a Change. in the Law Was
Needed
Initially, it may be helpful to discuss what exactly process pat-
ents are and their importance with respect to the commercial com-
petitiveness of the United States. Section 101 of the Patent Act of
1952 states the following: "Whoever invents or discovers any new
and useful process... may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title.",3 Section 100(b) defines
the term "process" as a "process, art or method, and includes a new
use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of
matter, or material."4
Basically, there are two types of process patents: (1) methods
of use; and (2) processes of manufacture. One may obtain patent
protection on a method of using a particular product to achieve a
particular result. For example, a method of using a quality control
apparatus to detect defects in a polymeric substance is a method of
use. It is important to note, however, that the Act does not apply
to process patents that do not produce products (i.e. methods of
use), since previously existing patent laws prohibited the unautho-
rized use of such patents.' On the other hand, one may obtain
patent protection on a process of manufacturing a particular prod-
3. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
4. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (1988).
5. Id. § 271(a); S. REP. No. 83, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987); see 134 CONG. REC.
8909-8910 (1988) (statement of Sen. DeConcini); 133 CONG. REC. 20,473 (1987) (state-
ment of Sen. Hatch),
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uct, for instance, a process of manufacturing a polymeric substance.
This is the type of process patent to which Congress expected the
Act to apply.
As one could imagine, process patents that produce products
have enormous economic reward and commercial value in various
disciplines, such as the biotechnology, bioengineering, semiconduc-
tor fabrication, fiber optics manufacture and pharmaceutical indus-
tries. However, prior to the Act, the sale or use of products in the
United States made from a patented process practiced in a foreign
country did not constitute infringement under the United States
patent laws.6 The only protection patent process holders had was
the right to exclude others from using the patented process. There-
fore, one could manufacture a product in a foreign country using
a process that was only patented in the United States and thereafter
import and sell that product in the United States without legal re-
percussions.
Clearly, the importation, use and sale in the United States of
-products made from processes patented in the United States drasti-
cally diminished the commercial value of such patents and exer-
cised an injustice on owners of United States process patents. The
Act sought to remedy this injustice by giving United States patent
process owners the right to exclude others from importing, selling,
or using in the United States, products resulting from the patented
process.7 The rationale for including products obtained from a
patented process in the scope of the protection afforded by the
process patent is the same as that adopted by the European Patent
Convention, the Community Patent Convention, and the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).8 This rationale was
articulated in a memorandum prepared by the International Bureau
6. Koratron Co. v. Lion Uniform, Inc., 449 F.2d 337, 338 (9th Cir. 1971) ("It is
settled that the sale of a product made from a process does not infringe a patent on that
process."); American Graphophone Co. v. Gimbel Bros., 234 F. 361,368 (S.D.N.Y. 1916)
("[A] process patent is not infringed by selling the product, and the vendee of a product
which has been made in infringement of a patented process cannot be held liable to the
patentee, or in any extent to be an infringer."), affd, 240 F. 974 (2d Cir. 1917).
7. S. REP. No. 83, supra note 5, at 30.
8. Id.
1993]
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of WIPO:
The extension (to the product of the process) seems to be
an exception to the principle that the protection conferred
by a patent or another title of protection for an invention is
defined by the object of the invention. In the case of a
process invention, a strict application of the said principle
would mean that the owner of a process patent could only
exclude others from using the patented process. The legal
provisions which extend process protection to products ob-
tained by the patented process are based on practical eco-
nomic considerations.. A process which leads to a specific
product presents an economic value only through the prod-
uct. However, it is not always possible to obtain a patent
for the product; for example, the product may not be new
or may-although -new-lack inventive step. The invention
of a new and inventive process for the production of such
a product which is not patentable constitutes an important
technological advance but the reward granted through a
process patent is not important because-without an exten-
sion to the product-the process patent would be difficult
to enforce (since infringement of the process is difficult to
prove) and could even be circumvented by use of the pro-
cess in another country where the process is protected. In
order to make patent protection of a process meaningful, it
is therefore necessary to consider the patented process and
the resulting product as a whole, with the consequence that
process protection is automatically extended to the resulting
product even if the said product has not been claimed.9
With the creation of the Act, United States patent laws were
brought into significant conformity with those of the European
Patent Convention and other industrialized countries.10 The intent
of Congress was to elevate the rights of process patent owners to
9. Id. at 30-31 (citation omitted).
10. However, patent protection offered under United States law is somewhat different
from that which is provided under the European patent law system. A discussion of these
differences is beyond the scope of this Article.
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such an extent as to put process patent owners on equal footing
with product patent owners. Furthermore, Congress wished to
balance the interests of patent owners against the interests of im-
porters, sellers, and end users of products made from patented
processes who will unlikely be able to determine if the product was
made from a patefited process."
However, has Congress achieved its goal? Has seeking this
conformity caused the pendulum to swing too far in favor of pro-
cess patent owners? Are the legitimate interests of end users of
products made from patented processes adequately protected?
B. Method of Use vs. Process to Make
Although numerous patent practitioners employ the terms
"method" and "process" in an interchangeable fashion, there is
indeed a distinction, as discussed above, between methods of use
and processes to make. Nowhere does this distinction appear to be
more important than when dealing with the Act, which does not
offer protection for methods of use.
Under § 271(g), "[w]hoever without authority imports into the
United States or sells or uses within the United States a product
which is made by a process patented in the United States shall be
liable as an infringer ...., Section 271(g) and the legislative
history make clear that the Act is only intended to offer protection
to those processes that produce products. However, what about
methods of use that may be incorporated into processes to make?
Does the degree of protection depend upon the drafting skills of the
patent practitioner?
These questions can best be analyzed in the context of two
hypothetical situations: first, reacting elements A and B to manu-
facture widgets, which is a known prior art process; and second,
reacting elements A and B to manufacture widgets which is a novel
process. Inventor X develops a quality control mechanism, Q,
which detects defects in widgets. Inventor X comes to you, a pat-
11. See S. REP. No. 83, supra note 5, at 40.
12. 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (emphasis added).
19931
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ent practitioner, for advice. How should you draft a claim?
A claim for manufacturing widgets may read as follows:
1. A process for manufacturing widgets, comprising the
steps of:
reacting a mixture of elements A and B at an elevated
temperature of 70°C to 140°C in an inert atmosphere.
A claim for detecting defects in widgets may read as follows:
2. A method of detecting defects in widgets, comprising
the steps of:
exposing the surface of widgets to apparatus Q.
Claim 1, assuming the process is novel, would result in prod-
ucts that would be protected by the Act. However-it follows
from the terms of the Act-the products of claim 2 that, standing
alone, are subjected to the quality control mechanism, would not
be worthy of such protection.
Now assume that claim 1 was known in the art. What if the
patent practitioner were to combine claims 1 and 2 to read as fol-
lows?
3. A process for manufacturing widgets comprising the
steps of:
reacting a mixture of elements A and B at an elevat-
ed temperature of 70'C to 140'C in an inert atmo-
sphere to produce widgets; and
thereafter exposing the surface of said widgets to
apparatus Q.
The Act would seem to accord protection to products made by
claim 3 because the claimed process is producing a product and
thus within § 271(g)-even though the first step is known. Thus,
the questions are presented: If a method of use for quality control
is tagged to an unpatentable process to make, can it result in a
patentable process? Does such a result not put the public at the
mercy of the drafting skills and savvy of the patent practitioner?
Is this exalting form over substance?
Assuming it is fair to allow one to convert a quality control
[Vol. 3:441
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method that detects defects to a finished "product" of a process to
manufacture, one must then ask whether it makes a difference if
this quality control method is introduced before achieving the end
product. That is, to what extent is process control the equivalent
of a process to make? For example, assume the prior art discloses
that a polymer composition could be molded at a temperature in
the range of 100°C to 110°C, and if the temperature went above
110°C, the polymer would decompose. Assume further that in
molding parts from the plastic, the reject ratio was high because the
mold heated up during use, and it was difficult to time the opening
of the mold before exceeding 110°C. Assume that the invention
consists of placing a thermocoupler in the mold and connecting it
to a microprocessor that automatically opens the mold so that
1100 C is not exceeded. Is this a method to use equipment or a
process to make? It is in the nature of a method to use a mold.
It is also in the nature of a quality control method applied to a
molding method midstream rather than post-completion. Thus, in
this situation a piece of apparatus (i.e. quality control measure),
which does not change the known parameters of the process but
applies them more efficiently, may be claimed in a process patent
such that a process to make a product is set forth rather than a
control method. With that in mind, will the courts look beyond the
plain language of the preamble to the claim? Is the draftsman wise
to discard the word "method" from his vocabulary and describe the
invention as a "process"?
II. INFR]NGEMENT UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 271(g)
The basic infringement provisions are set forth in 35 U.S.C. §
271(g), which reads as follows:
Whoever without authority imports into the United
States or sells or uses within the United States a product
which is made by a process patented in the United States
shall be liable as an infringer, if the importation, sale, or
use of the product occurs during the term of such process
patent. In an action for infringement of a process patent,
no remedy may be granted for infringement on account of
the noncommercial use or retail sale of a product unless
19931
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there is no adequate remedy under this title for infringe-
ment on account of the importation or other use or sale of
that product. A product which is made by a patented pro-
cess will, for purposes of this title, not be considered to be
so made after-
(1) it is materially changed by subsequent processes; or
(2) it becomes a trivial and nonessential component of
another product. 13
The exceptions set out represent compromises reached during
the lengthy legislative debate that led to the present Act; however,
Congress offered little guidance on the meaning of these excep-
tions. We will explore these exceptions in detail.
A. Products Exempted
Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(g), a product may not be considered
made from a patented process if certain modifications have been
made to that product. Congress recognized that in certain situa-
tions products created from patented processes may be altered to
such an extent as to preclude a finding of infringement.
14
In many foreign countries, where the patent laws extend protec-
tion to products resulting from patented processes, infringement
occurs only if the product is made "directly" from the process.15
13. 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (emphasis added).
14. See S. REP. No. 83, supra note 5, at 36, 49-52.
15. Id. at 49.
Many foreign patent statutes extending process protection to the product
resulting from the process include the limitation that the patented product be
made "directly" from the process. They use the word "directly" to exclude as
an infringement the importation, use or sale of a product which is materially
changed from the product resulting from the patented process by subsequent
steps or processes.
Id.
Further, article 64(2) of the European Patent Convention states, "[i]f the subject-
matter of the European patent is a process, the protection conferred by the patent shall
extend to the products directly obtained by such process." EUROPEAN PATENT CONVEN-
TION: CONVENTION ON THE GRANT OF EUROPEAN PATENTS art 64(2) (Kurt Haertel ed.,
Volker Vossius trans., 1973).
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Although Congress agreed "that once a product has been materially
changed... subsequent purchasers, users and sellers should no
longer be liable for process patent infringement,"' 6 it rejected the
"directly" language as too restrictive:
[Tihe Committee decided against including the word "di-
rectly" in the statute out of concern that the word "directly"
might have been construed too broadly and possibly exempt
too many products that have been altered in insignificant
ways after manufacture by the patented process. These
products ought to be treated as infringing under the bill.'7
As a result, Congress adopted a disjunctive two-part test by
which exemption from infringement is determined. 8 Under this
test, "[a] product which is made by a patented process will... not
be considered to be so made after--i) it is materially changed by
subsequent processes; or (2) it becomes a trivial and nonessential
component of another product."'19
1. "Materially changed"
Congress originally proposed a two-pronged test to define "ma-
16. S. REP. No. 83, supra note 5, at 49.
17. Id. "Industry advocates" were concerned that the term "directly" might be
interpreted too narrowly, such that it would "exclude products that had been altered in
trivial ways after the stage of manufacture where the patented process was used." On the
other hand, certain members of the Committee exhorted that by including the "directly"
language, uniformity would be promoted in that United States law would "conform to the
norm of industrialized nations" and patent process protection would not become too
broad. The final language adopted was a compromise between both parties. Id. at 46.
18. 35 U.S.C. § 271(g). According to the legislative history:
The Committee expects the courts to exercise careful judgement [sic] in distin-
guishing those products that are too far removed from the patented process, and
those that have been changed only in insignificant ways. The Committee be-
lieves that the courts wrill be in a better position to settle such issues without the
standard of "directly" constraining their judgment.
S. REP. No. 83, supra note 5, at 49.
19. 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (emphasis added). It was thought that the "trivial and nones-
sential" language would "further assist!' the courts in their attempt to distinguish products
that are too far removed from the patented process. S. REP. No. 83, supra note 5, at 50.
19931
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terially changed." 20 A product that is made by a patented process
is not materially changed:
1. If it would not be possible or commercially viable to
make [a] product but for the use of the patented pro-
cess.
2. If the additional processing steps ... do not change the
physical or chemical properties of the product in a man-
ner which changes the basic utility of the product by the
patented process.
The legislative history suggests that "[i]n judging commercial
viability, the courts shall use a flexible standard which is appropri-
ate to the competitive circumstances."22 In this regard, the Senate
Report offers a number of examples to "help provide additional
resources to the courts." A chemical example is provided as fol-
lows:
[1.] If the patented process produces chemical X, any
person importing, using or selling chemical X is
liable for infringement.
[2.] If riew entity, chemical Y, is produced from chemi-
cal X as the result of a material change, the court
must also consider the other phase of the test before
deciding if Y is infringing or non-infinging: [sic]
[3.] If the only way to have arrived at Y is to have used
the patented process at some step, e.g., producing X
as an intermediate, Y is infringing.
[4.] If there is more than one way to have arrived a [sic]
20. S. REP. No. 83, supra note 5, at 50-52.
21. Id. at 50 (emphasis added).
However, a change in the physical or chemical properties of a product, even
though minor, may be "material" if the change relates to a physical or chemical
property which is an important feature of the product produced by the patented
process. Usually, a change in the physical form of a product (e.g. the granules
to powder, solid to liquid) or minor chemical conversion, (e.g., conversion to
a salt, base, acid, hydrate, ester, or addition or removal of a protection group)
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Y, but the patented process is the only commercially
viable way to have done so, Y is infringing.
[5.] If there are commercially viable non-infringing pro-
cesses to have arrived at X, the connection between
the patented process for producing chemical X and
the ultimate product, chemical Y, is broken, and Y
would be a non-infringing product having satisfied
both phases of the test.'
Of particular interest is an example given in the- Senate Report
relating to a "metal strip":
A metal strip with certain unique properties is produced by
a U.S. patented process. A foreign competitor makes the
strip using the process, then turns the strip into a core, puts
the core in a transformer and imports the transformer into
the United States. Even if there ivere other commercially
or economically viable non-infringing processes for making
the strip, this is still a clearcut case of infringement of the
process patent that this Act is intended to prevent because
the subsequent changes would not be considered material. 4
If the "metal strip" example is compared to the chemical example
above, wherein the evidence of a commercially viable alternative
precluded a finding of infringement, one must ask how the results
reached in the two examples can be reconciled. That is, the chemi-
cal product would be exempt from infringement if there are viable
alternative commercial means of producing the chemical. In con-
trast, the metal strip is not exempt from infringement even though
there are viable alternative commercial means of processing the
strip.
The only difference, it would appear, is that the chemical prod-
uct has taken on a "new utility," whereas the metal strip has main-
tained its original "basic utility." One may argue, therefore, that
commercially viable alternatives are not a consideration with re-
spect to whether or not a product made from a patented process has
23. Id. at 50-51. See H.R. REP. No. 60, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 1, 13-14 (1987).
24. S. REP. No. 83, supra note 5, at 50 (emphasis added).
1993]
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retained its "basic utility." Thus, for a product made from a pat-
ented process to be exempt from infringement, it must satisfy both
aspects of the "materially changed" test. That is, to be exempt
there must exist a commercially viable noninfringing alternative
process that changes the "basic utility" of the product.
One must question whether this makes sense. Is it not unduly
burdensome and contrary to logical thought to require a competitor
both to formulate a commercially viable noninfringing alternative
process and to produce a product that does not have the same basic
utility as the product made from a patented process? Assuming the
end product of the patented process is marketable and desirable,
why would a competitor with a commercially viable alternative
process seek to produce a product whose basic utility diverges from
the basic utility of the product made from the patented process?
2. 'Trivial and nonessential" •
The second part of the two-part disjunctive test adopted by"
Congress would exclude products made from patented processes if
such products were a "trivial and nonessential component of anoth-
er product."25 However, how does one determine if a product is
"trivial and nonessential"?
The examples in the legislative history are not very helpful.
The Senate Report states:
In the semiconductor industry, a manufacturer may have
a process patent for forming a semiconductor structure in a
semiconductor substrate. Subsequent processing to com-
plete and finish the component does not materially change
the semiconductor substrate in which the semiconductor
structure formed. In addition, a court could determine that
25. The House version of the bill adopted the phrase "minor and nonessential,"
however the House acceded to the Senate version of "trivial and nonessential." It appears
that the Senate version provides the process patent owner greater protection than the
House version, in that many products may be considered to be "minor" but not "trivial."
For example a screw or a nut used on an aircraft may be considered to be a "minor"
component of the aircraft but not a "trivial" component, because the screw or
nut-although minor-performs the essential function of holding the aircraft together.
[Vol. 3-441
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the cost of a semiconductor component was trivial in rela-
tion to the cost of the whole product, but if that same com-
ponent is essential to the intended function of the whole
product then it would be covered by this title.26
The semiconductor example provided in the Senate Report
suggests that the monetary value of the component should not be
the standard by which we judge the essentialness of the component.
Certainly, one can imagine a situation in which a component made
from a patented process is relatively inexpensive when compared
to the cost of a product of whigh it is a part. Nevertheless, the
component may be vital with respect to the operability of the prod-
uct.2
7
Another inappropriate standard would be a test based on func-
tionality. Every component of a product would be essential in the
sense that it provided some function, although relatively minor
when compared to the functions other components perform. There-
fore, the "trivial and nonessential" exception would be rendered
meaningless if the standard were merely based on the functional
quality of a particular component.
A somewhat more viable and equitable standard may be that
which is suggested by Professor Dratler.2 8 That is, "[w]here com-
ponents are made using a patented process, determining whether
they are 'trivial and nonessential' in a particular product should
require analyzing their advantages in that product relative to com-
mercially available substitutes. 2 9 Thus, if there are no commer-
cially available substitutes that would provide an equally satisfacto-
ry component, the product made from a patented process would
then appear to be an essential component. An equally satisfactory
component is one that, when compared to a product made from a
patented process, is of similar cost and offers similar advantages.
26. S. REP. No. 83, supra note 5, at 51.
27. For example, a spark plug with respect to an automobile or a reed with respect
to a clarinet.
28. JAY DRATLER, INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY LAW: COMMERCIAL, CREATIVE AND
INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY § 3.02[2] (1991).
29. Id.
19931
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However, this "commercially available substitutes" test of the
"trivial and nonessental' provision of § 271(g) appears to be the
same as the "but for" test employed in the "materially changed"
aspect of § 271(g).30 If this were the case, one could conclude that
if a product is held not "materially changed by a subsequent pro-
cess" (i.e. no commercially available substitutes), then the infring-
ing product is not "trivial and nonessential." On the other hand, a
product which satisfies the "but for" test of "materially changed"
would also be "trivial and.nonessential" due to the existence of
"commercially viable substitutes." Nevertheless, the product may
infringe if it has retained "the bsic utility of the product [made]
by the patented process," despite the existence of commercial avail-
able substitutes.
As a result, the "materially changed" test of § 271(g) would
render the "trivial and nonessential" test moot if it were limited to
a "commercially viable substitutes" analysis. One must ask then,
when or in what circumstances is a product which is not "material-
ly changed" a "trivial and nonessential" component? In light of the
fact that the legislative history justifiably frowns upon purely finan-
cial analysis, perhaps the approach for "trivial and nonessential"
becomes very similar to the evaluations of "materially changed."
For example, if a method to make a core for a spark plug were
the subject matter to be analyzed (i.e.. the product made fron a
patented process), the first step would be to examine the product
(i.e. the sparkplug). The analysis would be to determine whether.
subsequent steps in the process to finalize the spark plug materially
changed it.
In contrast, the second step encompassing the "trivial and non-
essential" test can be applied on two levels. First, is the patented
process used to make the internal core material of the sparkplugs?
If not, is that internal core material trivial and nonessential to the
spark plug? On the other hand, suppose that the spark plug is
incorporated into an automobile. Is the spark plug a trivial and
nonessential part of the automobile? Clearly, any number of spark
30. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 3:441
PROCESS PATENT AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1988
plugs could perform the function and the spark plug is an insignifi-
cant portion of the cost of the automobile, but could the section
analysis achieve a just result? The problem appears to be in ascer-
taining what exactly the relevant "product" is.
It appears that a purpose of the "trivial and nonessential" provi-
sion may be to grant some latitude to a manufacturer who buys a
large number of goods to select minor components without being
unduly burdened in determining if they are made by a
noninfringing process. With this in mind, the standard for contrib-
utory infringement may offer some guidance.
A contributory infringer is one who sells a component of a
patented invention or a material or apparatus for use in a patented
process which constitutes a material part of the invention, knowing
the item is adapted for infringement and that the article is not a
staple item of commerce.31 Thus, the focus is on whether the pro-
cess produces a part or material whiclh has unique properties.
Does the "trivial and nonessential" test really accomplish the
purposes of the Act? It is not hard to propose a set of facts where
inequitable results would occur. For example, if a domestic auto-
mobile manufacturer imported spark plugs made by an infringing
process, he could be liable for infringement, even though they are
"nonessential" to operation of his domestically made car. In con-
trast, a foreign car company using the same spark plugs could im-
port complete automobiles and not infringe because the spark plug
is a "trivial and nonessential" item of the large product (i.e. the
automobile).
The legislative history suggests that the patent owner could still
sue the importer of the automobile and obtain some damage relief
based on an apportionment of the contribution of the infringing part
31. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c).
Whoever sells a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination
or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented
process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be
especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent,
and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial
noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.
19931
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to the value of the product. The legislative history further suggests
that injunctive relief might not be appropriate under these circum-
stances.32 Thus, Congress seems to be suggesting that if the com-
ponent was of minor value to the overall product, an injunction
would not be appropriate. Does this mean Congress then endorses
courts' ability to issue compulsory licenses for future imports in
this situation? Or would the patentee be required to file suit re-
peatedly for future infringements? Suppose the court does not
issue injunctive relief. Can the patentee claim willful infringement
for further importations? Congress's suggestion is troublesome in
that it seems to endorse a compulsory license for domestic import-
ers of large products in relation to minor components, whereas U.S.
manufacturers would not be able to use the same components. All
in all, the legislative history concerning trivial and nonessential
components provides conflicting guidance to courts and presents
the possibility that the statutory language may be construed to be
essentially meaningless.
B. The Meaning of "Imports" in Light of Bristol-Myers
Section 271(g) of Title 35 impacts "[w]hoever without authority
imports into the United States... a product." At what point is a
product considered to be imported into the United States? The Act
itself does not define the term "import."
However, in Bristol-Myers Co. v. Erbamont Inc.,3 3 the United
States District Court for the District of Delaware offered some
guidance with respect to the meaning of "import." In Bristol-
Myers, the accused infringer, Bristol-Myers, arranged for a Japa-
nese supplier to ship a large quantity of the drug doxorubicin into
the United States. The drug was alleged to be made by a process
covered by plaintiff's patent. The shipment arrived at a Puerto
Rico trade zone on February 16, 1989, one week prior to the effec-
tive date of 35-U.S.C. § 271(g). The drug remained in the custody
of the United States Customs Service until May 1, 1989. In the
32. S. REP. NO. 83, supra note 5, at 51.
33. 723 F. Supp. 1038 (D. Del. 1989).
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interim, on April 13, 1989, Bristol-Myers received FDA approval
to distribute the drug.
Erbarnont sought to establish that the mere arrival of the drug
in Puerto Rico was not "importation" under the Act and thus that
the drug was not imported before the effective date of the Act.
Erbamont argued that a product is not imported until it has lawfully
cleared customs and entered into United States commerce. Further,
Erbamont asserted that the presence of the drug in the United
States was conditional on FDA approval, and it asserted that impor-
tation of the drug was not complete until approval was received;
otherwise Bristol-Myers had the contractual right to return the
goods.34 The district court rejected these arguments:
IThe terms "importation" and "import" in § 271(g) (and
the term "imported" in § 9006 of the Act) are to have their
plain ordinary meaning of bringing goods into the United
States from another country. This term does not depend on
or require an analysis of the intent of the person in bringing
the goods into the United States. Furthermore, it is not
necessary that the goods in issue have passed through U.S.
Customs to be imported under § 271(g) and § 9006 of the
Act.35
Therefore, the term "import' in § 271(g) has no special meaning,
but simply denotes the bringing of goods from a foreign country
into the United States.
Though physical presence in the U.S. and its territories appears
to be sufficient, what about the case where goods are delivered
into, or are in transit through, the U.S. foreign trade zones? In the
context of trademark law, the court in Ocean Garden Inc. v.
Marktrade Co."5 addressed the issue of "whether Congress has the
power to regulate commerce within United States foreign trade
zones, or whether it has precluded the reach of the Lanham Act
into such zones by withdrawing from them Congress' relevant
regulatory powers."37 The United States Court of Appeals for the
34. Id. at 1044.
35. Id.
36. 953 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1991).
37. Id. at 504.
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Ninth Circuit held that Congress did not withdraw its power, but
rather retained its authority. 38 It referred to 19 U.S.C. § 81c, which
states: "Foreign and domestic merchandise of every description,
except such as is prohibited by law, may, without being subject to
the custom laws of the United States ... be brought into [foreign
trade zones].,, 39 The court went on to analyze the Code of Federal
Regulations, which provide that "[d]istrict directors shall not admit
prohibited merchandise., 40
Prohibited merchandise is defined as "merchandise the importa-
tion of which is prohibited by law on grounds of public policy or
morals, or any merchandise which is excluded from a zone by
order of the Board.' The court also referenced 19 C.F.R. §
133.21(a), which reads "[a]rticles of foreign or domestic manufac-
tare bearing a mark or name copying or simulating a recorded
trademark or trade name shall be denied entry and are subject to
forfeiture as prohibited importations." 42
Therefore, the court concluded that: "It is reasonable to infer
that merchandise that infringes trademarks under section 133.21(a)
would be another example of prohibited merchandise under section
146.3 V'43 The court also stated: "Given this fact, entry of infring-
ing goods into a foreign trade zone is a sufficient act in commerce
to trigger subject matter jurisdiction in federal courts under the
Lanham Act, which, by definition,.can only be brought to vindicate
marks that enjoy protection in the United States by virtue of proper
registration." 44
One can conclude from the holding in Ocean Garden that if the
existence of goods in a foreign trade zone can serve as the basis
for subject matter jurisdiction under the Lanham Act, then by anal-
ogy, the same can serve as the basis for jurisdiction under 35
38. Id. at 505.
39. 19 U.S.C. § 81c(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
40. Foreign Trade Zones, 19 C.F.R. § 146.31(a) (1992).
41. Id. § 146.1(b)(13). The Board consists of the Secretary of Commerce, the Secre-
tary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of the Army.
42. Trademarks, Trade Names, and Copyrights, 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(a) (1992).
43. 953 F.2d at 505.
44. Id.
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U.S.C. § 271(g).
C. Liability of Noncommercial Users and Retail Sales
The statute provides that no remedy may be granted for non-
commercial use or retail sale.45 However, this exemption is condi-
tioned upon the existence of an adequate remedy elsewhere. What
is retail sale? Is it limited to sales to individuals? Does it include
the retail sales of products to "commercial" customers? One defi-
nition of "retail" is "the sale of goods to ultimate consumers, usual-
ly in small quantities." 46 Another definition is, the sale of com-
modities or goods in small quantitiesY7 "Retailing" has also been
defined as "the activities involved in the selling of goods to- ulti-
mate consumers for personal or household consumption."
4
The legislative history is clear that sale of drugs to individual
consumers is considered sale to a "noncommercial user"49 and
therefore retailing. Thus, a drug store is protected, provided it does
not also import. One point for clarification is the definition of
retail sale and whether it is dependent on noncommercial use. Is
retail sale limited to sales to noncommercial consumers? Is there
any reason that sales to a corporate end user should not also be
considered retail? Should a large drug store chain be entitled to
avoid liability for sales of drugs to customers while a seller of
industrial saw blades would be liable even though the blades were
only used by timber mills? The two examples below would give
the following results:
1. The drug
a. Drug store retailer: No liability if not the im-
45. 35 U.S.C. § 271(g).
46. BLAcK's LAW DICrIONARY 1315 (6th ed. 1990).
47. THE RANDOM House DICTIONARY oF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED
1642 (2d ed. 1987).
48. WEBSTER'S THIRD Nsv INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED 1938 (3d
ed. 1986).
49. S. REP. No. 83, supra note 5, at 48. "Finally, there is no intent whatsoever for
the innocent consumer to even be subject to suit." Id. at 52.
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porter or manufacturer or controlled by either.
b. Individual consumer: No liability because of
noncommercial use.
2. The saw blades
a. Industrial saw blade supplier: No liability if not
the importer or manufacturer or controlled by
either.
b. Mill user: Liability as a commercial user.
3. Either drug or saw blade
Liability would exist for the manufacturers and importers in each
case. The patentee could proceed against the retailer only if he has
no other adequate remedy.
Who has the burden to establish the lack of adequate remedy?
Is the exhaustion of remedies an element the patentee must prove,
or is it the burden of the retail seller or noncommercial user? It
seems that it should be an element the patentee must bear once the
retailer has established retail sales. The legislative history demon-
strates this provision was in response to a concern to balance the
rights of the patentee against the "innocent" infringer. Also, it
seryes to force the patentee to go to a defendant closer to the
source of the infringing process. Is the provision a restriction on
recovery of damages? It appears that the provision is a restriction
designed to foctis on the real parties in interest50
It is interesting to note that the statute does not provide for
recovery based on retail sales activities unless there is no other
adequate remedy. The plain language of the statute appears to
indicate that the exemption applies to the individual acts of sale,
rather than to individual defendants. Therefore, a combined retail-
er/distributor is protected, insofar as the sales are retail.
Clearly, Congress did not intend for the patentee to be able to
obtain profits generated down the distribution line by retail sellers.
After all, the patent monopoly must extinguish someplace. As the
courts have held, once a patentee collects damages from a manu-
50. S. REP. No. 83, supra note 5, at 39, 47-48.
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facturer, it cannot also collect damages from customers,5 and while
some caselaw has recognized that a claim Would exist against the
customer who was an original defendant, any recovery against such
customer should be minimal.52 Congress must have known that
any patentee who produced a product and retailed it would be able
to claim lost profits, which included retail mark-up. Thus, the
mere fact that the patentee cannot recover damages for retail sales
does not constitute "no adequate remedy," thereby allowing him to
proceed against the retailer.
There are only two situations in which the "no adequate reme-
dy" rule seems to apply. First, where the importer is insolvent or
unable to respond to the damages. In that instance, perhaps the
retailer would be or could be liable. The other instance is injunc-
tive relief. Consider the saw blade example above. Where a retail-
er sells to an individual end user who is a commercial user, an
injunction prohibiting the individual user who is a defendant may
not be adequate. The sale of the blades to others would result in
infringement as well. Therefore, injunctive relief against the retail-
er to prohibit sales to commercial users would be appropriate to
prevent infringement by others not party to the action, but a dam-
age award would be inappropriate.
If the Act was intended to place apparatus patents and process
patents on an equal footing, then the provision exempting retail
sales is contrary to that intent. After all, the retailer seller of a
patented apparatus would be an infringer. A significant difference
at the retail level between apparatus and process patents is that if
one sells a patented apparatus, by access to the product he theoreti-
cally has all the information needed to determine infringement. In
51. Wagner Sign Serv. v. Midwest News Reel Theatres, 119 F.2d 929, 930 (7th Cir.
1941) ("lit is the generally accepted doctrine that where a patentee has been fully com-
pensated by an infringing manufacturer for the manufacture and sale of the infringing
device, the patentee has no recourse against a customer of such infringing manufacture
who is solely a user of such device.").
52. Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("Once full
recovery is obtained from one infringer with respect to a particular infringing device, at
most nominal additional damages may be awarded against another with respect to the
same devicd.").
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contrast, the retailer of a product made by a patented process typi-
cally is several levels removed from the manufacturer and has no
information as to the process employed to make the product.
I. PRESUMFTION THAT PRODUCT IS MADE FROM PATENTED
PROCESS
The Act provides for presumption of infringement in 35 U.S.C.
§ 295, which states:
§ 295. Presumption: Product made by patented process
In actions alleging infringement of a process patent
based on the importation, sale, or use of a product which is
made from a process patented in the United States, if the
court finds-
(1) that a substantial likelihood exists that the product
was made by the patented process, and
(2) that the plaintiff has made a reasonable effort to
determine the process actually used in the production of the
product and was unable to so determine,
the product shall be presumed to have been so made, and
the burden of establishing that the product was not made by
the process shall be on the party asserting that it was not so
made.53
A first item of note is that while the presumption is not explic-
itly referencing practice of the process by a domestic manufacturer,
the reference to sale would include U.S. manufacturers. Obviously,
at some point, the U.S. manufacturer will sell the product. Howev-
er, the legislative history tends to support an argument that this
provision does not apply to domestic manufacturers, which states:
The Committee notes that the rebuttable presumption
would be inapplicable if the defendant has used the process
53. 35 U.S.C. § 295 (1988). "This presumption addresses the great difficulties a
patentee may have in proving that the patented process was used in the manufacture of
the product in question where the manufacturer is not subject to the service of process in
the United States." S. REP. No. 83, supra note 5, at 57.
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in the United States, or has derived the products directly or
indirectly from a manufacturer who used the process in the
United States. In these circumstances, the discovery provi-
sions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the equi-
table powers of Federal courts should be sufficient to allow
the plaintiff to ascertain what process was employed.54
Thus, a nonmanufacturing user or seller from a domestic manufac-
turer may have less exposure than one who purchases from a for-
eign manufacturer. However, the statutory language is such that
courts may not recognize any distinction based on location of man-
ufacture. Thus, a potentially significant change is that the domestic
manufacturer may suffer a presumption of infringement for an item
made by a patented process but never be subject to such a pre-
sumption for a patented product.5
The presumption requires two elements of proof. These ele-
ments were incorporated into § 295 "[t]o minimize the risk of ag-
gressive litigation intended to discourage firms from carrying com-
peting products. ' 56 Congress was well aware of the difficulties this
provision could create. The presumption addresses the great diffi-
culty a patentee may have in proving that a patented process prac-
ticed overseas infringes. Congress recognized that while the defen-
dant might not necessarily have in its possession the means neces-
sary to rebut the presumption, it was in a far better position than
the patentee to obtain them. The purchasers had the right of in-
demnification5 The two elements which seek to offer some pro-
tection to the defendant are discussed below.
A. "Substantial Likelihood"
The Act provides little guidance as to what is meant by "sub-
stantial likelihood" that the product was made by the patented pro-
cess. The first question is how to establish a substantial likelihood.
Does "substantial likelihood" require the same standard of proof
54. S. REP. NO. 83, supra note 5, at 58.
55. Thus, in doing clearance studies one must consider the processes as well.
56. S. REP. No. 83, supra note 5, at 57.
57. Id.
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one would need to demonstrate to achieve a preliminary injunction
in an apparatus case, i.e. substantial likelihood of infringement?
Can the substantial likelihood test be met by a reasonable belief in
conjunction with the absence of denial from the infringer? The
legislative history states:
Exactly how much evidence will be needed in particular
situations to satisfy the "substantial likelihood" condition
will depend on the circumstances. However, the patentee's
burden would be less than that of proving successfully at
trial by a fair preponderance of the evidence that a product
in question was in fact made by the patented process but
would be more than a slight possibility that the product was
so made."8
Although Congress intended the patentee's burden of proof to
be something less than a "fair preponderance of the evidence,"
exactly how much less is uncertain. One suggestion by Congress
was that evidence of substantial likelihood could include chemical
analysis of the product which had indications or "marks" in the
product itself from the process. Another suggestion was the use of
expert testimony regarding known methods of production and the
costs that would justify sale of the product at the prices being
charged. 9
B. A "Reasonable But Unsuccessful Effort"
The second prong that the patentee must satisfy to achieve the
presumption is that a reasonable' but unsuccessful effort was made
to determine the process actually used.61 If the patentee has a rea-
sonable belief that the process used by the accused manufacturer
infringes, the patentee may send a notice to the accused infringer,
but such notice must state some reasonable basis for the belief of
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. The legislative history states "t]he reasonableness of the effort would include
the use of discovery procedures under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or other good-
faith methods, such as requesting the information from the manufacturer, if not subject
to U.S. jurisdiction." S. REP. No. 83, supra note 5, at 58.
61. 35 U.S.C. § 295(2)
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infringement. Thus, this provision would seem to require that the
notice must (1) contain a reasonable basis for the belief that the
patented process is being used, and (2) must be sent to an appropri-
ate party. Therefore, the presumption will likely be applied where
efforts were made to deal with the manufacturer, or if unknown, to
deal with the party in the chain of distribution closest to the man-
ufacturer. The legislative history would seem to support such a
conclusion:
While the defendant may not necessarily have in its posses-
sion the means necessary to rebut the presumption, it is
likely to be in a far better position than the patentee to ob-
tain them. Importers, for example, because of their rela-
tionships with foreign manufacturers, may be able to exert
pressure on such manufacturers to produce the necessary
information. Users and sellers who purchase possibly in-
fringing articles from importers may be able to exert similar
pressure on those importers, who would in tum influence
foreign manufacturers.6 2
These provisions probably could not be satisfied merely by
stating a suspicion that the product infringes, but rather there must
be some real basis. Otherwise, a patentee could send numerous
notices without any basis for infringement whatsoever. No party
should be put to the expense of responding to a bald allegation at
the risk of presumption of infringement. The recipient, however,
is faced with difficult choices on how to respond to a notice where
he has difficulty in determining whether there is any reasonable
basis or belief for the charge.
Furthermore, in the instance where there is some reasonable
basis for the patentee's suspicion of infringement, how is the ac-
cused infringer to avoid the presumption? For example, suppose
the accused infringer has a trade secret process which does not
infringe, but which leaves a telltale element that is a signature of
the infringing process. While the Act provides that a patentee need
not disclose his trade secrets when sending a notice, no such recip-
62. S. REP. No. 83, supra note 5, at 57.
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rocal protection is provided for the purported infringer. Thus, the
alleged infringer is in the unenviable position of deciding whether
to reveal a trade secret or to ignore the notice.
It would seem that such an -accused infringer has several op-
tions, among which would include a response to the patentee that
its process is a trade secret and not infringing, along with some
type of offer to permit review under a confidentiality agreement.
This, of course, highlights the inherent problems. Who would be
allowed to review the, information? Obviously, the accused infring-
er would not want its competitor to have the confidential informa-
tion. Further, to what extent would the alleged infringer be entitled
to enforce such an agreement, and more importantly, how would it
ever be aware of a violation of the agreement?
Suppose the information is disclosed in confidence with the
restriction that it is not to be used. However, suppose the patentee
then broke the confidence and used the process of the previously
alleged infringer. Assume that the patented process and the trade
secret process both leave a telltale chemical at about the same
level. Thus, the accused infringer with the trade secret process
could not rely on just the sale of the product in order to prove a
theft of the secret or even bring a suit in the first place. Perhaps
the offer should include a willingness to disclose a trade secret
with an obligation that the patentee will-not use it, and further with
a right in the accused infringer to make inspections of the paten-
tee's plant and records to assure no breach in the future. If the
patentee objects to such a proposal, has his effort been reasonable?
On the other hand, could the accused infringer respond merely
with a request that the patentee demonstrate to him that there is no
other process known to the patentee which results in the trace tell-
tale element? Suppose a patentee fails to respond with such proof,
but later after filing suit, uses such proof to support a showing of
substantial likelihood and utilizes the alleged infringer's failure to
explain his process as further evidence. It would appear that the
alleged infringing manufacturer would have a better bargaining
position to achieve a confidentiality agreement which would allow
him the right to monitor the patentee prior to filing suit than simply
asking the patentee for further evidence, although the inquiry may
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PROCESS PATENT AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1988
be the same.
Consider these two scenarios. First, in response to the paten-
tee's notice the accused infringer contends that his process is a
trade secret which is not infringing and requests the patentee to
enter into a confidentiality agreement whereby the accused infring-
er discloses his process and the patentee grants the accused infring-
er the right to monitor the patentee's process in the future. Howev-
er, the patentee subsequently refuses to do so and then sues. To
what extent has the patentee complied with the requirements of
making a reasonable attempt to determine the process utilized?
Courts will have to resolve these issues, but equity would seem to
favor some recognition of the need to protect the accused infring-
er's information.
In the second scenario, .the accused infringer responds, asking
the patentee for his evidence that there is no other suitable or com-
mercially viable process. The patentee refuses to provide the infor-
mation and files suit. At trial, the patentee presents such informa-
tion. The accused infringer is not the manufacturer and does not
possess that knowledge. Is it fair to allow the patentee to withhold
such information and force the accused to rely on cooperation of
a supplier who may be far removed?
As will be discussed below in the notice section, in considering
the applicability of the presumption it seems that the following
factors should be considered:
1. The extent to which the patentee's belief is based on
scientific evidence;
2. The extent to which the patentee's case is based on cir-
cumstantial evidence, i.e. cost or purchase of raw mate-
rials;
3. The extent to which the patentee had attempted to direct
notice to the manufacturer or the person known to the
patentee closest to the manufacturer;
4. Whether the party accused of infringing the patented
process practices the process in the United States;
5. The response of the infringer-if a manufacturer, to
what extent he was willing to provide process informa-
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tion; if a nonmanufacturer, to what extent he attempted
to achieve information from the manufacturer; and
6. The extent to which the patentee was forthright with the
nonmanufacturing defendant in providing information.
IV. NOTIFICATION OF INFRINGEMENT: WHERE TO BEGIN?
A. Notice Is Actual Knowledge-Written Notification
The Act contains some stringent and complex notice provisions
that were intended to prevent abusive and coercive allegations of
infringement against recipients of a product made by a patented
process.63 Obviously, the threat of an infringement suit, coupled
with the threat of presumed infringement, is a substantial coercive
tool the patentee can direct against a nonmanufacturing recipient.
Thus, notice of infringement must be sent to certain classes of
defendants to balance the interests of the parties. The notice provi-
sions are set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 287.
1. Who must receive notice?
Under the Act, notice must be sent to the nonmanufacturing
recipient or user of the product, but it is not required to be sent to
the manufacturing defendant.64 Notice to the nonmanufacturing
recipient must be sufficient to give a reasonable basis for a claim
of infringement.65
a. Notice to the nonmanufacturing recipient
The Act provides that in the absence of notice, there can be no
remedy against a nonmanufacturer, and until notice is given, no
cause of action accrues against the nonmanufacturer. These notice
provisions reflect the sensitivity of Congress to the plight of inno-
cent purchasers of goods under the Act. In relevant part, the new
63. 35 U.S.C. § 287.
64. Id. § 287(b).
65. Although no notice is required to the manufacturer under the Act, this is not a
departure from existing caselaw.
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statute provides:
Section 287. Limitations on damages and other remedies;
marking and notice
(b)(2) No remedies for infringement under section
271(g) of this title shall be available with respect to any
product in the possession of, or in transit to, the person
subject to liability under such section before.that person had
notice of infringement with respect to that product. The
person subject to liability shall bear the burden of proving
any such possession or transit.
(5)(A) For purposes of this subsection, notice of in-
fringement means actual knowledge, or receipt by a person
of a written notification, or a combination thereof, of infor-
mation sufficient to persuade a reasonable person that it is
likely that a product was made by a process patented in the
United States.
(B) A written notification from the patent holder charg-
ing a person with infringement shall specify the patented
process alleged to have been used and the reasons for a
good faith belief that such process was used. The patent
holder shall include in the notification such information as
is reasonably necessary to explain fairly the patent holder's
belief, except that the patent holder is not required to dis-
close any trade secret information.
(C) A person who receives a written notification de-
scribed in subparagraph (B) . .. shall be deemed to have
notice of infringement with respect to any patent referred to
in such written notification or response unless that person,
absent mitigating circumstances-
(i) promptly transmits the written notification or
response to the manufacturer or, if the manufacturer
is not known, to the supplier, of the product pur-
chased or to be purchased by that person; and
1993]
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(ii) receives a written statement from the manu-
facturer or supplier which on its face sets forth a
well grounded factual basis for a belief that the
identified patents are not infringed.
66
A party is required to receive notice of infringement unless he
falls within one of the categories of § 287(b)(1). This section pro-
vides:
(b)(1) An infringer under section 271(g) shall.be subject
to all the provisions of this title relating to damages and
injunctions except to the extent those remedies are modified
by this subsection or section 9006 of the Process Patent
Amendments Act of 1988. The modifications of remedies
provided in this subsection shall not be available to any
person who-
(A) practiced the patented process;
(B) owns or controls, or is owned or controlled by, the
person who practiced the patented process; or
(C) had knowledge before the infringement that a pat-
ented process was used to make the product the importa-
tion, use, or sale of which constitutes the infringement.67
The "notice of infringement" can be satisfied under 35 U.S.C.
§ 287(b)(5)(A) by either (1) actual knowledge of information suffi-
cient to persuade a reasonable person that it is likely that a product
is made by a patented process in the United States, or (ii) receipt
of a "written notification" of such information, or (iii) the combina-
tion of actual knowledge and written notification of suck informa-
tion. Since actions against nonmanufacturers require notice, one
must recognize the problems with establishing such notice. How
does a plaintiff patentee satisfy Rule 11 and yet employ some of
these provisions?68 That is, how does the patentee prove actual
knowledge? There will probably be a few cases where the patentee
66. 35 U.S.C. § 287.
67. 35 U.S.C. § 287(b)(1).
68. See FED. R. Cv. P. 11 (providing that no attorney or party shall sign legal papers
unless the facts contained therein are accurate to the best of the signer's knowledge,
information, and belief).
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learns that the defendant has actual knowledge. However, the actu-
al knowledge provision may find application in pushing back the
date of notice to increase damage exposure. Can actual knowledge
be used in a circumstance where a suit is based on defective writ-
ten notice but where discovery has progressed far enough to estab-
lish actual notice prior to the defective notice of infringement?
Where there is a lack of "actual knowledge," 69 the defendant
must receive the statutorily required "notice of infringementf' in the
form of "written notification" as that term is used in 35 U.S.C. §
287(b)(5)(B). Such written notification must specify the patented
process alleged to have been infringed and the reasons for a good
faith belief that such process was used, and must include "such
information as is reasonably necessary to explain fairly the patent
holder's belief."'70
How much information is needed in the notice of infringement?
The statute says the patentee does not have to disclose trade se-
crets. Does this provision offer an election such that the patentee
can elect not to disclose trade secret information and forego notice,
or does it mean that the patentee, who has such trade secret infor-
mation, has no obligation to convey all the information it has
which would establish reasonable belief of infringement? Both
would seem appropriate. The notice is destroyed where the pur-
chaser receives back from the manufacturer a statement as to why
there is no infringement. However, note that there is no require-
ment that the response be sent on to the patentee. One rationale
for extinguishing notice is that the nonmanufacturing recipient is
then merely put in the middle of a factual contest between the two
parties in interest. Professor Chisum has opined:
Section 287(b) contemplates a "stalemate" when there is a
difference of opinion as to whether or not the product in
question is made by a process covered by a United States
patent.... For example, in the "notice of infringement"
69. 35 U.S.C. § 287(b)(5)(A). The Act assumes the manufacturer has actual knowl-
edge and imputes such knowledge to a purchaser who is owned or controlled by the
supplier.
70. 35 U.S.C. § 287(b)(5)(B).
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protocol, assume (1) a process patent owner sends to a ma-
jor importer/retailer an adequate written notification of in-
fringement as to a product; (2) the importer/retailer for-
wards the notification to the manufacturer of the product;
and (3) the manufacturer provides to the importer/retailer a
written statement that sets forth "on its face!' a "well
grounded factual basis for a belief that the identified patents
are not infringed." The importer/retailer is not under "no-
tice of infringement," at least not by virtue of the patentee's
notice of infringement.
71
Suppose further that the response from the manufacturer is that
they have filed a declaratory judgment action against the patentee.
Would this extinguish a reasonable notice of infringement?
B. Ramifications of Lack of Notice
Failure to provide adequate notice results in a loss of right
against the recipient. Thus, in order to proceed against a party who
neither practices the invention nor is controlled by the party prac-
ticing the invention, adequate notice is required. This raises an
interesting jurisdictional point. Suppose that notice is sent which
is considered by the recipient to be inadequate. The patentee be-
lieves notice is sufficient and later files suit. To what extent can
the suit be supported by later events? Suppose the court agrees
that the notice was not adequate. Can the patentee, by deposing
the producer or other discovery, later claim notice has been made
adequate? If so, does the court have jurisdiction or must the case
be refiled? There will undoubtedly be some very interesting juris-
dictional battles similar to those in declaratory judgment actions.
V. AcTIoNs TO BE TAKEN IN RESPONSE TO A NOTICE
Taking appropriate action upon receipt of a notice is important
in receiving the benefits of the Act if one is a nonmanufacturer.
Interesting issues arise regarding notice. For example, the language
71. 4 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS § 16.02[6], at 16-56 (1992).
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of the Act encourages a recipient of notice to contact its supplier
or manufacturer; however, the Act provides no guidance concerning
the use or disposition of any response received from the manufac-
turer. The actions to take upon receipt of notice are different,
depending on whether one is the manufacturer, distributor or retail-
er. It is important to act upon the patentee's notice in order to
have the opportunity to defeat the presumption of infringement.
Again, this area raises a number of significant issues to be ad-
dressed below.
A. Effect on the Recipient of Notice of Infringement
Notice to the nonmanufacturer who is not owned or controlled
by the manufacturer or is without actual knowledge is a require-
ment for recovery.72 Additionally, an effective notice of infringe-
ment would seem to result in the presumption that the product is
made by the patented process under 35 U.S.C. § 295. Recall, §
295 provides for such a presumption if the court finds that: (1)
there is a substantial likelihood that the product is made by the
patented process, and (2) the claimant has made a reasonable but
unsuccessful effort to determine the process actually used in pro-
duction of the product. If these two elements are established, then
the burden of proof shifts to the party asserting that the product
was not made in an infringing manner.
The first question is whether the notice of infringement in itself
is sufficient to establish that a substantial likelihood exists that the
product is made by the patented process. Note that this language
is different from that in the notice, which requires only sufficient
information to persuade a reasonable person that it is likely the
process is infringing. These two provisions are not co-extensive,
and it appears that the duty placed upon the court is to determine
whether the reasonable basis for believing there is infringement
rises to the level of substantial likelihood. The second prong of the
test, whether the claimant has made a reasonable effort, is only
72. 35 U.S.C. § 287(b)(5)(B).
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briefly discussed in the legislative history' and suggests that the
patentee should attempt to contact the manufacturer directly.74
Since the Act's central purpose is to obtain information from the
actual manufacturer, such a reasonable effort should include at least
a contact with the offending manufacturer.
B. Ramifications of Lack of Response
Failing to respond to an adequate notice results logically in a
probability that the time for damages will begin either (1) upon
receipt of the adequate notice, (2) after a reasonable time to evalu-
ate the notice, or (3) after a reasonable period has passed without
response from the manufacturer to an inquiry from the
nonmanufacturer. Also, a response can contain information which
removes or negates the notice.75 Thus, failing to respond may
increase the time period over which damages are recoverable.
Also, the Act specifically directs the court to consider the good
faith of each party,76 and lack of a response may result in a balance
of the equities tipping in favor of the plaintiff. The Act is vague
as to when infringement begins as a result of receipt of notice, and
the patent bar will have to await judicial clarification.
VI. THE "GRANDFATHER" CLAUSE
The effective date of the Act is six months after its date of
enactment and applies only with respect to products made or im-
ported after the effective date. The Act was passed on August 23,
1988, and became effective February 23, 1989.77 The Act also
contains a Grandfather Clause in § 9006(b) of P.L. 100-418, which
provides as follows:
(b) Exceptions-The amendments made by this sub-
73. S. REP. NO. 83, supra note 5, at 57-58.
74. S. REP. No. 83, supra note 5, at 58.
75. 35 U.S.C. § 287(b)(5)(C).
76. Id. § 287(b)(3)(A).
77. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat
1563 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 271, 287 (1988)).
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title shall not abridge or affect the right of any person or
any successor in business of such person to continue to use,
sell, or import any specific product already in substantial
and continuous sale or use by such person'in the United
States on January 1, 1988, or for which substantial prepara-
tion by such person for such sale or use was made before
such date, to the extent equitable for the protection of com-
mercial investments made or business commenced in the
United States before such date. This subsection shall not
apply to any person or any successor in business of such
person using, selling, or importing a product produced by
a patented process that is the subject of a process patent
enforcement action commenced before January 1, 1987,
before the International Trade Commission, that is pending
or in which an order has been entered.78
It should be noted that the language of the Grandfather Clause
is substantially identical to that of the second sentence of the sec-
ond paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 252 relating to equitable intervening
rights arising from reissue or reexamination. The second paragraph
of 35 U.S.C. § 252 provides:
No reissued patent shall abridge or affect the right of
any person or his successors in business who made, pur-
chased or used prior to the grant of a reissue anything pat-
ented by the reissue patent, to continue the use of, or to sell
to others to be used or sold, the specific thing so made,
purchased or used, unless the making, using or selling of
such thing infringes a valid claim of the reissued patent
which was in the original patent. The court before which
such matter is in question may provide for the continued
manufacture, use or sale of the thing made, purchased or
used as specified, or for the manufacture, use or sale of
which substantial preparation was made before the grant of
the reissue, and it may also provide for the continued prac-
tice of any process patented by the reissue, practiced, or for
the practice of which substantial preparation was made,
78. Id. § 9006, 102 Stat at 1563.
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prior to the grant of the reissue, to the extent and under
such terms as the court deems equitable for the protection
of investments made or business commenced before the
grant of the reissue.7 9
The first consideration is to whom the Grandfather Clause of-
fers protection. Does it protect the foreign manufacturer, the im-
porter, or the retailer? The Grandfather Clause does not protect the
foreign manufacturer unless the manufacturer is also the importer
and seller in the United States-by the explicit terms of the Grand-
father Clause, it is limited to actions in the United States. At least
one court has interpreted that the Grandfather Clause does not offer
protection to foreign manufacturers. 80 In Allegheny Ludlum Corp.
v. Nippon Steel Corp., the court stated:
[1]n the Senate Report regarding the Act, the Senate Com-
mittee stated, "The primary target of the U.S. process
patentholder will naturally be the manufacturer, who is
practicing the process and importing the resulting goods in
the United States.... In any case, the Committee does not
expect or intend the bill to be used to sue purchasers of the
product, when the infringing manufacturer can be sued
instead." S. Rep. No. 100-83, at 39, 47. Clearly, then, the
first portion of the Grandfather Clause was only to apply to
persons in the United States who are not allegedly infring-
ing manufacturers.8
Thus, the Grandfather Clause clearly does not protect the foreign
manufacturer.
The next question is whether it protects a United States manu-
facturer. The answer to this question should also be "no." Basi-
cally, the Grandfather Clause has one major restriction, to the ex-
tent its protection would be "equitable." How can a U.S. manufac-
turer who has been infringing the process directly under § 271(a)
79. 35 U.S.C. § 252 (1988).
80. See Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. Nippon Steel Corp., 765 F. Supp. 224,226 (E.D.
Pa. 1991); see also Shamrock Technologies, Inc. v. Precision Micron Powders, Inc., 20
U.S.P.Q.2d 1797 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
81. 765 F. Supp. at 226.
[Vol. 3.441
PROCESS PATENT AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1988
prior to the enactment of the Act claim an entitlement to any equi-
ty? One such situation where there may be a possible claim by the
domestic manufacturer is where the Act changes the forum in
which he is subject to suit. Prior to the Act, some courts had held
that infringement of the process patent-occurred where the manu-
facturing takes place.82 Further discussion on this point is beyond
the scope of this Article, and we leave it to the reader to consider
whether this Grandfather Clause can equitably be invoked to pre-
vent jurisdiction over the manufacturer in a forum other than where
he practices the process (should such a manufacturer be able to
escape the jurisdiction of other forums where he resides and in
which he has sold the product produced by the patented process).
The Grandfather Clause clearly applies to distributors. Howev-
er, is any protection really afforded? How can a distributor have
a substantial investment or have made substantial preparation? His
cost would be the cost of inventory, distribution control, maybe
repackaging, sales force, etc. If the courts apply the same stan-
dards that are applied in 35 U.S.C. § 252 to intervening rights
resulting from broadened claims in reissue patents, then the Grand-
father Clause does not offer much comfort. Among the often-recit-
ed remedies available under § 252 are that the court may permit
unconditional continuation of the business, permit business to con-
tinue at the same level, or permit continuation of business until
investment is recouped. In many instances, a distributor will
quickly recoup the cost associated with adding a product. Then
does equity say he is out of business?
Does it make a difference whether this is his sole product or a
major source of his revenue? What about an instance where at the
time of passage of the Act the product was a relatively small per-
centage of the manufacturer's revenue but has grown to a substan-
tial percentage at the time suit was filed? In the case of the reissue
patent, one takes a snapshot at the time of the reissue. Here, how-
ever, the situation is slightly different-the snapshot is taken at the
82. See United States v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle, m.b.H., 670 F.2d 1122, 1127
(D.C. Cir. 1981); Koratron Co. v. Lion Uniform, Inc., 449 F.2d 337, 338 (9th Cir. 1971).
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date specified in the Grandfather Clause which is different from the
effective date of the Act. No real explanation for this divergence
is presented, but the divergence could support arguments that the
Grandfather Clause is to be more liberally construed and precedent
from reissue cases is not to be strictly followed. In any event, the
Grandfather Clause offers little solace when one considers the poor
showing intervening rights have been accorded under § 252.
The Grandfather Clause provisions would also apply to a retail-
er; however, a retailer already enjoys protection from liability.
This is an additional protection for those retailers who are also
distributors.
VII. WILLFUL kNFRINGEMENT
One question under the Act is whether the nonmanufacturer can
be charged with willful infringement. In the very beginning of the
Act, it is noted that good faith is relevant in determining even basic
infringement by a nonmanufacturing seller or user. 3 The person
who buys a patented product and resells it is liable for infringement
without regard to his knowledge of the infringement. By contrast,
the same person selling a product made by a patented process must
have notice that the product is so made. Thus, even before in-
fringement can be found, the party must be shown to have some
information which would at least demonstrate or support a reason-
able belief that the product was made by the patented product.
Does this mean that the party receiving notice is ipso facto a
willful infringer? Obviously, in many situations the party receiving
the notice will not have the means by which to make a determina-
tion as to whether the process used infringes. Many times they
will have no more than the allegations of the patentee in contrast
to denials by the manufacturer. Indeed, the manufacturer could be
less than forthcoming with the truth with respect to the process.
Thus, the receiver of the notice faces a number of difficulties not
faced by most alleged infringers: He will likely not have access to
the details of the process or to persons knowledgeable in the art,
83. 35 U.S.C. § 287(b)(3)(A).
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and he will lack resources to devote to such questions. At this
stage, one must assume that there is the potential for some recovery
for willful infringement. The attorney's dilemma is how to advise
a client when the supplier refuses to provide information and the
client is thus denied the necessary information to make a reason-
able determination as to infringement (and many times as to validi-
ty). Courts will have to determine if the guidelines for willful
infringement are different for purchasers than for practitioners of
the process.
CONCLUSION
The Process Patent Amendments Act has not been brought to
bear in many cases to date. Congress had sufficient concerns about
the Act and as a result conducted a review of the Act five years
after its enactment. However, it is quite likely that the implications
and problems of the Act will not come to light until much later.
The Act may provide an impetus for the development of two bod-
ies of law: one for process patents and the other for non-process
patents. Further, the principles could be different for manufacturers
and nonmanufacturers. Such a result would be contrary to the
intended purpose of the Act. Significant uncertainties exist in the
interpretation and application of the Act offering attorneys the
challenge of formulating arguments which further the aims of Con-
gress.
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